Partition and Empire

September 22 and 23, 2016

The imperial partitions of the twentieth century reverberate to the present, and inform contemporary insecurities of different regimes across the world. Present-day challenges to the post­colonial nation­state and its boundaries are often rooted in imperial partitions. Whether in Kashmir, Syria or Palestine, the legacies of partition form the everyday experiences of conflict and violence for millions of people. With these considerations in mind, this conference will explore the theme of partition and empire in global, comparative, and connective frames. Topics include but are not limited to violence; sovereignty; sexuality and the body; displacement and dispossession; memory and cultural production; territoriality and borders; identity and state formation; pedagogies and/or epistemologies of partition.

Keynote Speaker, Sept. 22:

Urvashi Butalia, Publisher and Co-Founder of Kali for Women and Founder of Zubaan Books

Time: 7:00 pm 
Location: Knight Auditorium, Spurlock Museum, 600 S. Gregory, Urbana

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General Sessions, Sept. 23: 

Time: 9:00 a.m. - 5 p.m. with lunch break 12:00 - 1 p.m.Location Illini Union General Lounge, Room 210Illini Union1401 West Green StreetUrbana, Illinois  61801Directions and Parking

Speakers:

• Arie M. Dubnov, Senior Lecturer, University of Haifa; 
• Rajmohan Gandhi, CSAMES Emeritus Faculty; 
• Pranav Jani, Associate Professor of English at The Ohio State University; 
• Brian Kelly, Queen's University Belfast; 
• Aparna Kumar, UCLA; 
• Feargal MacIonnrachtaigh, Institute for Collaborative Research in the Humanities, Queen’s University Belfast; 
• Deepti Misri, Associate Professor of Women and Gender Studies, University of Colorado, Boulder; 
• Debali Mookerjea-Leonard, James Madison University, 
• Ibrahim Natil, Visiting Fellow Researcher, University College Dublin; 
• Penny Sinanoglou, Assistant Professor of History, Wake Forest University.

The imperial partitions of the twentieth century reverberate to the present, and inform contemporary insecurities of different regimes across the world. Present-day challenges to the post­colonial nation­state and its boundaries are often rooted in imperial partitions. Whether in Kashmir, Syria or Palestine, the legacies of partition form the everyday experiences of conflict and violence for millions of people. With these considerations in mind, this conference will explore the theme of partition and empire in global, comparative, and connective frames. Topics include but are not limited to violence; sovereignty; sexuality and the body; displacement and dispossession; memory and cultural production; territoriality and borders; identity and state formation; pedagogies and/or epistemologies of partition.

Urvashi Butalia is keynote speaker for Partition and Empire Conference, September 22

Partition and Empire

September 22 and 23, 2016

The imperial partitions of the twentieth century reverberate to the present, and inform contemporary insecurities of different regimes across the world. Present-day challenges to the post­colonial nation­state and its boundaries are often rooted in imperial partitions. Whether in Kashmir, Syria or Palestine, the legacies of partition form the everyday experiences of conflict and violence for millions of people. With these considerations in mind, this conference will explore the theme of partition and empire in global, comparative, and connective frames. Topics include but are not limited to violence; sovereignty; sexuality and the body; displacement and dispossession; memory and cultural production; territoriality and borders; identity and state formation; pedagogies and/or epistemologies of partition.

Keynote Speaker, Sept. 22:

Urvashi Butalia, Publisher and Co-Founder of Kali for Women and Founder of Zubaan Books

Time: 7:00 pm

Location: Knight Auditorium, Spurlock Museum, 600 S. Gregory, Urbana

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

General Sessions, Sept. 23: 

Time: 9:00 a.m. - 5 p.m. with lunch break 12:00 - 1 p.m.

Location Illini Union General Lounge, Room 210Illini Union1401 West Green StreetUrbana, Illinois  61801Directions and Parking

Speakers:

Arie M. Dubnov, Senior Lecturer, University of Haifa; 
Rajmohan Gandhi, CSAMES Emeritus Faculty; 
Pranav Jani, Associate Professor of English at The Ohio State University; 
Brian Kelly, Queen's University Belfast; 
Aparna Kumar, UCLA; 
Feargal MacIonnrachtaigh, Institute for Collaborative Research in the Humanities, Queen’s University Belfast; 
Deepti Misri, Associate Professor of Women and Gender Studies, University of Colorado, Boulder; 
Debali Mookerjea-Leonard, James Madison University, 
Ibrahim Natil, Visiting Fellow Researcher, University College Dublin; 
Penny Sinanoglou, Assistant Professor of History, Wake Forest University.
The imperial partitions of the twentieth century reverberate to the present, and inform contemporary insecurities of different regimes across the world. Present-day challenges to the post­colonial nation­state and its boundaries are often rooted in imperial partitions. Whether in Kashmir, Syria or Palestine, the legacies of partition form the everyday experiences of conflict and violence for millions of people. With these considerations in mind, this conference will explore the theme of partition and empire in global, comparative, and connective frames. Topics include but are not limited to violence; sovereignty; sexuality and the body; displacement and dispossession; memory and cultural production; territoriality and borders; identity and state formation; pedagogies and/or epistemologies of partition.

Play Review: "9 Parts of Desire"

"9 Parts of Desire" played at the Krannert Center for Performing Arts in October, 2013.  Several students of Dr. Dina Khamis attended and wrote the following review.

Ameer Al-Khudari, Sarah Bakir, Jessica Sciubba and Zachary Parker

As a class (composed of Americans, Arab- Americans, Arabs and Europeans) studying Gender and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century Arabic Literature with Professor Dina Khamis, we found Heather Raffo’s play, “9 Parts of Desire,” to be an interesting and relevant extension of our course curriculum. We believe that the themes it explores, specifically the experience of Iraqis during wartime, are universal in their appeal.

But “9 Parts of Desire” can muddled and confusing. The play is not comprised of a singular and cohesive narrative – instead, it carves nine windows into the lives of Iraqi women living in and between the first and second Gulf wars.  Raffo wants to show us that Iraqi women are far too complex to be represented in just one prototypical character with just one story.  There is no monolithic Iraqi woman, no quintessential female Iraqi life journey, Raffo argues. The Iraqi female perspective can only be given justice through the buildup of as many perspectives as possible, if it can be adequately explained at all.

This disjointedness, then, is a necessary cost that Raffo pays in service of a larger purpose. In juxtaposing these disparate stories, she hopes to disabuse her Western target audience of myths that restrict what an Iraqi woman can be. These nine characters are pulled from all parts of the spectrum—or as much of it as the time constraints of the play allow—of Iraqi women. In place of these myths, Raffo aims to equip the audience with a more holistic conception of Iraqi women—one that expands significantly on the impoverished and claustrophobically narrow stereotypes that Westerners have historically imposed on them.

The Iraqi woman, the viewer learns through Raffo’s characters, is not always a shabbily dressed and ghoulish-looking maid, who, as a prisoner in her own home, is subservient to the whims of her husband. She can be a jumpsuit-wearing, gym-going American, or a whiskey-drinking, foul-mouthed Londoner.  And the Iraqi woman’s spirit can also be manifested in the form of a fiercely independent, pugnacious Baghdad artist. The Iraqi woman, according to Raffo, can be anyone and anything. In Raffo’s world, Iraqi women have agency, regardless of their ethnic or religious background. In this respect, they are much like women everywhere else; they are veritable human beings, with all the attendant complexities, foibles and pathologies of peoplehood.

Contradictory to that commendable attempt at fleshing out the depth of the Iraqi female persona are the over-done accents that not only inhibit understanding, but also serve to reinforce stereotypes.  The broken and stilted English of many of the Iraqi characters awkwardly contrasts with the perfect grammar of Heather, the play’s sole Iraqi-American.  While these accents were likely used to give the play an authentic feel, the casting of actors did little to help—in short, the casting failed to portray the diversity of physical characteristics of Arabs.

However, Raffo’s ultimate goal of humanizing the Iraqi people and their experiences is not completely lost in translation. Audience members can still walk away from the play having recognized a familiar part of themselves in Raffo’s characters, and one step closer to realizing that just as there are no essential American women, the same is true of their Iraqi counterparts.

Islam and Women: Surveying the Academic Debate

David A. Rahimi

On October 9, 2012, Malala Yousafzai was shot in the head by the Taliban as she was returning home from school; three days later fifty Islamic clerics issued a fatwa (religious opinion) condemning the attack. On July 12, 2013, after a long, arduous recovery, Yousafzai spoke at the United Nations, calling for a worldwide increase in access to education. She accused the Taliban of “misusing the name of Islam . . . for their own personal benefit.”

Such episodes of violence and discrimination raise a perennial question for Islamic and Middle Eastern scholars: does Islam denigrate women?

This question has generated endless debate, and there is no unified answer. In this essay, I first examine the historical changes brought about by Islam, and then analyze the ways in which the Quran and hadith (the sayings and reported doings of Muhammad) can shed light on the role of women within Islam.

A polarized “yes-or-no” approach to studying Islam’s effect on women only serves to obscure the complexity of the issue, because it does not account for the intricate connections between accepted cultural mores and religion, which can contradict, reinforce, and transform each other. As Jennifer Bryson insists here on Public Discourse, it is often difficult to tell who or what speaks for Islam. In large part, this is because Islam does not have a definitive teaching authority that can objectively distinguish what is a core belief from what is merely cultural. As a result, Islam can be equally supportive of discrimination or of loving respect toward women depending on the cultural context.

One must consider Islam and the Quran holistically in order to comprehend the complex relationship between culture and Islam and to understand Islam’s impact on women. Thus, engaging the question of whether Islam denigrates women ought to begin with an historical examination of the jahilyya (pre-Islamic Arabia).

How did the rights and status of women in the jahilyya compare with the Muslim society and the Islamic faith that followed? Some Muslim scholars, such as Chiragh Ali and Mahjabeen Islam-Husain, have argued that women were treated as mere chattel and that polygamy and divorce were rampant. Leila Ahmed, however, argues that such a view of the jahilyya is simplistic and inaccurate. Though jahilyya wife-centered marriage practices did not necessarily give women much power, they do indicate that women enjoyed considerable sexual autonomy.

The life of Khadija, Muhammad’s first wife, exemplifies the positive aspects of pre-Islamic Arabian culture. Khadija was a wealthy widow, nearly twice the prophet’s age, who hired him as part of her caravan operations; her behavior and rights would have been dictated by the jahilyya rather than Islam. Khadija’s prominent social position demonstrates that women in the jahilyya participated actively in many communal activities, including warfare and religion. It is possible, then, that Islam’s establishment of patriarchal marriage may have curtailed women’s involvement in public life.

While it is true that Islam abolished infanticide and perverse divorce methods, cemented women’s inheritance and property rights, established spiritual equality between the sexes, and secured the wife’s sole right to the mahr (bride-price), its positive impact with respect to the jahilyya must not be exaggerated. As Ahmed indicates, Islam placed male-female relations on a new footing by transferring the rights to women’s sexuality and offspring from herself and her tribe to men, specifically her husband. Implicit in this new relationship was the male prerogative to control women’s relationships with other men. Later, the Abbasids would interpret Islam in ways that explicitly condoned men’s rule over women and the inferiority of the female sex.

What new relationship did Islam establish between men and women? And how do the Quran and the hadith depict it?

Start with marriage. In Islam, marriage is analogous to a business contract: the man pays the mahr and maintenance to the woman in exchange for complete obedience and exclusive sexual rights to her. This concept of obedience is borne out in the second part of Sura 4:34, in which a man is permitted to beat his wife for disobedience.

Unfortunately, when this contractual analogy is combined with other verses extolling God for putting love between men and women, one is left with an ambiguous conception of marriage. It seems that marriage involves a man keeping a favorite courtesan or mistress (albeit with deeper formal ties), not a relationship with an equal, beloved spouse. At best, the messages seem contradictory, leaving the reader unsure of how the verses fit together.

Scholars interpret Sura 4:34 differently, which contributes to confusion about its true meaning. Amina Wadud-Muhsin, an Islamic feminist scholar, retranslates and neuters the formerly gendered words of the passage based on the assumption that all masculine plurals refer to both men and women, which would suggest that men and women alike have reciprocal rights in marriage. Ibn Warraq, on the other hand, sees the passage as inherently misogynistic.

The difficulty of interpreting this passage points to a more fundamental problem. As Muhsin admits, no Quranic exegesis can be fully objective. Since there is no final exegetical authority, only the members of a particular social context can interpret how the principles of the Quran should be applied. Even a renowned Islamic cleric, who favors an egalitarian, non-violent interpretation of Sura 4:34, admits that it “takes an expert in linguistics to understand all the meanings in a verse, both explicit and inferred.” This underscores the dire need for a dogmatic interpretive voice in Islam if all Muslim women’s rights are to be upheld.

Unfortunately, the Quran often provides two sets of principles that seem to conflict (e.g., Sura 4:34 and Sura 33:35). Moreover, each scholar can apply the principles to particulars according to his or her own best judgment. Although many Muslims may choose to follow the interpretations of a particular imam or scholar, the lack of a single interpretive authority allows for some cultural relativism within Islam.

To see how this ambiguity causes problems, take the controversial issue of concubinage. The practice of theoretically unlimited concubinage was long believed to be halal (permissible) according to the Quran in Sura 4:3 and Sura 23:5-6. Ambiguity, however, plagues the passage, since it can be read either as an injunction to marry concubines or as an indulgence granted to men by God. Some scholars simply ignore the passage; while others explain it as a temporary byproduct of the seventh century Arabian culture, or say it remains permissible but impractical and unnecessary in today’s world.

It is not clear who possesses the authority to resolve such controversies. The literature of Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, is extremely varied regarding women’s status. Some may argue that fiqh promoting concubinage as permanent was merely a product of cultural misogyny. Yet it could also be argued in reverse that anti-concubinage fiqh is nothing but a modern cultural reading that easily could be reversed if cultural consensus shifts.

Other controversial passages include Sura 24:4-13, which has implications for rape testimony, and Sura 2:228, which deals with divorce. Sura 24:4-13 is often considered good for women, since it demands that a man bring four witnesses (typically males) to confirm a case of adultery or pre-marital sex, a measure designed to protect the woman from wrongful accusations. However, these same stringent standards hurt women by making it nearly impossible for them to defend themselves in rape cases, since a woman must have witnesses to prove that a man sexually penetrated her. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the Quran only gives a woman’s testimony half the weight of a man’s.

To get a sense of the practical importance of this text, consider the modern example of Pakistan. There one woman is raped every three hours and one in two rape victims is a juvenile. Seventy-five percent of all women in jail in Pakistan are there under charges of zina (unlawful or extramarital sexual intercourse) and are subsequently sexually abused while in prison.

Sura 2:228 is even more controversial. Islam-Husain selectively quotes it to justify equal rights for men and women by leaving out the portion that grants men a higher status than women. Similarly, Muhsin attempts to negate an androcentric interpretation by explaining that the verse is situated in the context of a discussion on divorce and that the higher status men enjoy is only with respect to divorce. This contextual explanation, however, should invite skepticism, because Muhsin’s application of it seems somewhat arbitrary. For example, Muhsin, in another section, expands Sura 4:34 to encapsulate all of society instead of limiting it to the family, which is the context in which it is being discussed. Why one passage is interpreted contextually and another is not is never fully explained.

These excerpts from the Quran show that we cannot simply attribute any misogynistic tendencies within Islamic societies to cultural distortions and permutations of Islam, since sections of the Quran can explicitly justify denigrating women. The second source of religious guidance in Islam, the hadith, also confirms this.

According to most scholars, the hadith are more explicitly misogynistic than the Quran. Some hadith claim that women are the primary occupants of hell or that they are bad omens on par with horses. One hadith even condemns a people to failure if they are led by a woman.

Yet as Moroccan Islamic scholar Fatima Mernissi notes, it is hard to know which hadith are authentic statements or actions of Muhammad. Mernissi argues that many of the misogynistic hadith are inauthentic or are the product of outdated cultural norms. Yet Mernissi’s argument cannot answer why the most rigorously authenticated set of hadith by al-Bukhari contains the same hadith she claims are inauthentic. Nor does she try to deconstruct the hadith about women in hell, which comes from the highly aesthetic and spiritual ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Umar.

Even Mernissi, then, seems to concede that at least some authentic hadith are indeed misogynistic. This leaves the scholar in her original dilemma: trying to reconcile the androcentric hadith and ambiguous Quranic verses with belief in the equality of the sexes.

So where does this historical and textual overview leave us in regard to my opening question?

First, Islam did improve the lives of women to a measurable extent. Islam cemented women’s rights to inheritance and property; it recognized their spiritual equality with men; it abolished female infanticide; it enjoined modesty upon both men and women; and it set a basis for judging men and women morally as individuals.

Yet Islam does contain some endorsements of patriarchy or misogyny. Not every misogynistic or androcentric expression in Muslim societies is a direct result of Islam; cultural attitudes (e.g. honor, shame, patriarchy) often instigate actions that shari’a condemns, such as murderous honor crimes. Still, some of the fundamental androcentric attitudes that lie at the basis of multiple Muslim societies today are either explicitly endorsed or ambiguously addressed in the Quran and hadith, leaving the meaning of the text at the whim of scholars.

There is no clear consensus among Muslim scholars, partly because there is no single exegetical authority. The fact that Islamic texts do not send a clear message about women’s status helps to explain why women are treated so differently across Muslim countries. Until more Muslims and non-Muslims admit this, it will remain difficult to pursue meaningful and principled discussions on women in Islam.

David A. Rahimi is a senior at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign pursuing a BA in history and political science. This essay is a revised and condensed version of a paper he wrote for RLST/ANTH/GLBL/GWS 403/HIST 434, “Women in Muslim Societies,” taught by Professor Valerie Hoffman.  David is preparing his honors thesis on Iranian exiles and historical memory under the supervision of Professor Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi. This essay was originally published in Public Discourse: Ethics, Law, and the Common Good, the online journal of the Witherspoon Institute of Princeton, NJ (http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/09/10825/).  It is reprinted with permission.

Experiencing the Intersections of Spain and Morocco

Tariq Shihadah, Class of 2015

It is one thing to learn about a culture from the outside, and another thing entirely to be deeply immersed in a world different from your own. There is no textbook nor lecture that can compare to smelling the fragrance of a land, walking through its streets, and meeting the faces of its people. This past summer I had the chance to do just that, as I, along with four other students and Professor Mark Dressman of the Department of Curriculum and Instruction, trekked through the lands of Andalusia and al-Maghreb.

After learning one evening of this unique opportunity to study the historic intersections of Spain and Morocco, I immediately completed my application and got in contact with the professor hosting the trip. When I applied for the study abroad trip that night, I didn’t necessarily have any intentions of pursuing it seriously; I only wanted to open the opportunity for myself for consideration in the future. However, as time passed and I was accepted to the program, I began to realize just how remarkable an option it was for me. As the day approached for me to make a decision, I nervously chose to join the trip -- a choice which afforded me one of the most extraordinary experiences of my life.

Our journey began the week after the Spring semester had ended, when we met in the Chicago O’Hare airport and flew overseas to the culturally rich city of Madrid, Spain. From this day on through the next two and a half weeks, we explored and immersed ourselves deeply in the cities, towns, and cultures of the Andalusian and Maghrebi regions, leaving no sound unheard and no dish untasted. In Spain we discovered the intricate beauty of the Al-Hambra in Grenada, visited the peculiar and fantastic cathedral within a mosque called the Mezquita, and even had the chance of visiting the British enclave of Gibraltar, named after the famed Muslim conqueror from the Maghreb region. In Morocco, we did everything from spending a night in an Amazigh camp in the Sahara Desert, to washing in a community bath house called a hammam, to wandering through the streets of historic cities such as Fez, Marrakesh and Rabat, intimately encountering exciting history and vivid culture.

As we travelled, we had the opportunity to meet and engage with several locals, who were able to teach us a great deal about the regions of Spain and Morocco, their histories, and their cultural intersections. We collected recordings and other media as we proceeded with our trip, and are now in the process of creating a curriculum supplement for teachers and students to learn about these topics through engaging and relatable materials. Collecting the media and information for this initiative has been a challenging yet exciting and very rewarding experience, and the chance to contribute to the world’s library of educational resources has been an honor and gift.

This spectacular trip was made possible in part for me by the CSAMES Undergraduate Scholarship for Study Abroad. I learned about this scholarship through the professor in charge of our study abroad program, and decided it was imperative that I apply for it to help make the trip a more financially feasible option for me. Shortly after completing a simple application on my computer, I was informed by the CSAMES department that I had been selected for the $1000 scholarship, which was to pay for more than 30% of the costs of the program.

This is only one example of how supportive the University of Illinois and its many departments of study are, as they help their students pursue cultural and academic enrichment. The opportunities for programs and trips similar to mine are everywhere, and the financial and advising support is accessible to all students. There are countless extraordinary and life-changing adventures out there, only waiting for students who are willing to take a step outside the normal and take a step into the breathtaking world around us.

Thoughts on the Political Significance of Election of Rouhani

The following comment was sent to me by one of the blog readers.

Since it is too long to be posted on the comments' space, I am sharing it with you here:

June 15, 2013

 

“When there is a general change of condition of conditions, it is as if the entire creation had changed and the whole world been altered, as if it were a new and repeated creation, a world brought into existence anew.”

                                                                                    The Moquaddimah, Ibn Khaldun

 

Mir-Housein Mousavi, an Islamic revolutionary with left political sensibilities was the prime minster of Iran (1981-1989) during the Iran-Iraq war and was highly favored by the late leader of Iran Khomeini. He entered the political scene as a candidate of June 2009 presidential election against incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejat after two decades of absence starting with the end of the war and the death of the Revolutions’ late leader. During these years much had changed. The post-war “era of reconstruction” under the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani had sought to normalize the decade long revolutionary and war politics and economics. In the usual narrative, these years moved toward economic liberalization within the framework of rentier state and set the stage for the political demands of the Reform movement expressed by  the 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami as the president.  Khatami’s era marked a moment of political opening and emergence of a rich public discourse on the history of Islamic Republic, the ideals of the Revolution and diversion from its goals. Unlike Rafsanjani’s technocratic style of government, the newly elect reformist government and its powerful establishment conservative critics staged 8 years of antagonistic politics. Although these years have secured historical achievements that I will suggest below, Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election and the unification of conservatives and hardliners behind him demonstrated a certain fragility, if not defeat, of the reformist politics.

 

In 2009 Mousavi re-entered the political scene to restore aghlaniat, the rule of reason, to Iranian politics. He clamed that Ahmadinejad, a relatively recent addition to Iranian politics who was riding the wave of hardliner-conservative alliance against reformism, and more importantly the form of politics that he stood for, was the counterpoint to aghlaniat. He mobilized the history and the memory of the Revolution and the war and his personal association with these events against the dominant political voice within Iran during 2009. Unlike secular-liberal critics of the Iranian government, he challenged the very revolutionary and Islamic claims of the established power. Ahmadinejad’s main line against Mousavi was that he was the candidate of the old guard who similar to Khatami, was towing the line of Rafsanjani. Backed by the establishment himself – the supreme leader announced after the elections that his views were much closer to Ahmadinejad than the others - he was able to secure a second term in the disputed elections. His deceptive populism and international posturing which today proved short lived at best and hollow at worst proved triumphant. The state violently suppressed the ensuring protests and dismissed their demands as fitna – a theological-political formulation of secessionist politics. Four dark years where security quenched politics ensued. All the while the economy neoliberalized. These years were further darkened by sanctions and treat of military intervention in Iran. Today the world changed

 

Today, Hasan Rouhani, a mujtahed of the Qom seminaries who holds a PhD fromUniversity of Glasgow became the president elect of the 34 year old Islamic Republic. Rouhani has a thick resume of activism and occupation of highest ranks in the Revolution, the war and its aftermath, including the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council during Rafsanjani and Khatami presidency. He won the office of the president in the name of e’tedal and tadbir: moderation and wisdom. E’tedal can be captured closely by moderation, and in the context of Rouhani’s use, counters the extremism associated with hardliners and the conservatives. Indirectly, but very importantly, E’tedal is a response to a certain political Islamism of the hardliners within personal, social, and the international domain; a highly statist Islam that mobilizes the disciplinary and regulatory powers of the state in imposing its vision. Tadbir translates to wisdom, meditation, accounting for the consequences, long term evaluation and implies, specially in the context of Rouhani’s usage, aghlaniat: reason. Therefore, tadbir, like e-tedal, is formulation of a certain raison d'État, a certain statecraft that we can recognize, with Machiavelli or Foucault among others, as politics.

 

During his campaign, Rouhani moved significantly towards the political goals that are largely associated with the reform movement and the discontented parties of the last presidential election. He spoke against the security state, closure of spaces for political speech and action, and government infringements on personal spaces within the domestic domain while articulating a strong diplomacy in foreign affairs. He explicitly countered the foreign policy advanced by the government of Ahmadinejad and articulated by the Iran chief  nuclear negotiator and the presidential hopeful Jalili as pandering to Islamic revolutionary slogans while receiving severe blows and passing them on the population (sanctions). Mohammad-Reza Aref, the only reformist candidate who had been able to pass through the Guardian Council pulled out in his favor and Rohani received strong endorsements from both Rafsanjani and Khatami. In his first address as the president elect a few hours ago, he recounted the names of Rafsanjani and Khatami on the national TV, a significant political speech act in so far as these two figures have been systematically tarnished by the hardliners and on the national TV since the 2009 elections.

 

Despite this association between Rouhani and the reform movement, and despite his explicit promise to do all he can to release political prisoners, and to undo the house arrest imposed on Mousavi, his spouse Zahra Rahnavard and Mehdi Karoubi (the other discontented candidate of the last election), I want to draw a different relation between Rouhani’s election and the reform movement more generally. Rouhani election is not the continuation of reform, but sublation of reform and a certain strand of hardline conservatism that has combated the reform since its inception in 1997. His election signals fruits of the reform movement, the triumph of its social and political discourse. It also signals, counter intuitively, an important developments among conservatives: the failure of the experience of Ahmadinejad or the form which it expresses, their failure to unite and their extreme fragmentation as the elections exposed, and more importantly, their inability to articulate an art of politics, a viable vision of coexistence and a statecraft Aref and the conservative Mohsen Rezai’s diagnosis of the hardliners during their campaign speaks to these developments among the conservative camp.

 

Rouhani, then, is not the middle ground between hardliners or reformists - a spatial formulation as if time is secular and history, thin. His election does not signal a “moderate” choice by the electorate, but a significant one in so far as it channels and builds upon the historical experience of the reformism and conservatism in the Islamic republic - their common forms, their particular achievements and defeats. Most importantly perhaps it speaks to the limit of a form of politics that is reduced to seizing the state and exclusion of political opponents. Perhaps this sublation is most clear in that Rouhani’s positions are only conceivable between the sign posts of Mousavi and the short-lived Khamenei-Ahmadinejad alliance: if it wasn’t for the radical position of Mousavi, Karoubi and the many others who paid and continue to pay a high price for making visible the law preserving violence of the state on the one hand, and those want-to-be-sovereigns within the hardline conservative camp, Rouhani would not be able to articulate the politics of e’tedal and tadbir.

 

In a field fraught with domestic instability, systematic political and religious suppression, “most crippling sanctions,” treat of war, and monopolization of the Iranian historical and popular desires by international war criminals outside Iranian borders, moderation and wisdom – politics - is given a chance. It’s a moment of ashtiy-e meli, national reconciliation. It is significant that this opportunity comes about not by increasingly ineffective and subverted revolutions, as the “Arab Spring” model is demonstrating, but through the vote. It remains to be seen what comes of this chance. 

 

Perhaps we can hope that under the sign of e’tedal and tadbir, the excessively violent domestic antagonism relaxes in favor of a different form of engagement, or if we fail as the reformism and conservatism of the last two decades did, we fail better, and we fail to secure as significant of achievements as they did. We hope too, in the spirit of hope expressed in the vote, that this fragile play of forces in Iran does not flatten by international pressure on Iran. As Rouhani said in relation to his victory:

 

“A new opportunity has come about in the international scene for those who speak in the name of democracy, pluralism, free speech and truth, to bear witness to this popular achievement, engage with the Islamic Republic with respect and justice, and accept the rights of the Islamic Republic in order to hear the appropriate response, and work together to expand international relations based on mutual interests, peace, security and development in the region and in the world.”

ROUHANI WINS!

  BEHROOZ GHAMARI  

In my last blog I said that on a good day Rouhani might even win the absolute majority and become the president in the first round. Well, it was a good day and he did win in a landslide. Here are some numbers for those of us who don’t believed anything unless it is quantified:

Participation: 72% (36 million out of 50 million eligible voters)

Rouhani: 50.70%

Qalbaf: 16.5%

Jalili: 11.3%

Reza’ei: 10.5%

Velayati: 6.1%

Gharazi: 1.2%

Invalid votes (known in the US as “hanging chads”): 1.2 million

Participation was so unanticipated that the government had to extend the voting hours three times.

By all measures, this was a surprise election, both in terms of participation rate as well as the fact that it produced a winner in the first round in a 6-way race. I think more than the shock of winning, it is the shock of losing that defines the outcome of this election, the shock of losing so dismally, that is, for the Supreme Leader.

Four years ago, in his Friday sermon a week after the disputed 2009 election, Ayatollah Khamenei openly endorsed Ahmadinejad and admitted to the rift that existed between himself and Ayatollah Hashemi-Rafsanjani. 

In his sermon, Rafsanjani defended the Green Movement and chastised the same government behind which the Supreme Leader threw his full support for suppression of dissent and mismanagement of the nation’s affairs. That was the last time Rafsanjani was permitted to address a Friday prayer.

When he was disqualified from running for presidency, Rafsanjani endorsed Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric with unimpeachable credentials as a loyal politician. Whereas Rafsanjani devised a clear strategic plan to restore his political authority, Khamenei and his conservative principlist allies struggled to put together a joint platform and a winning strategy to maintain their hold of the highest executive office.

First they formed the 2+1 in order to defend principlist conservatism from Ahmadinejad deviations and revisionism. The goal was to generate some momentum for a new alternative to the madness of Ahmadinejad without abandoning his populism and uncompromising, confrontational politics. Then Saeed Jalili entered the scene and every one thought that he will be the Supreme Leader’s “real Man.” But then, some others opined that Jalili might operate as Ahmadinjead’s Trojan Horse and must be stopped before getting inside the Supreme Leader’s quarters. The last minute effort to gather support for Velayati as the “establishment’s candidate,” also bore no fruits.

Many commentators repeated the tired rhetoric that the elections in Iran are meaningless and are merely performances to endow legitimacy to the wishes of the Supreme Leader. Despite the fact that the Supreme Leader himself could not identify whom he favored among the eight candidates, the hawkish Iranian opposition and their Western supporters believed peoples’ vote to be irrelevant.

There are two big losers in this election. First: The Supreme Leader, who made the grave mistake of endorsing the policies of Ahmadinejad, thus turning the election into a referendum on himself.  

Velayati, the Supreme Leader's trusted adviser, ended his race with a meager 6% of the vote!

Second: Those who pursue a regime change in Iran and believe that “crippling sanctions” (in the best case scenario) or “military intervention” (the worst case scenario) will eventually force Iranian people to rise up against the Islamic Republic and topple the regime. Every time there is an election in Iran, they repeat the same mistake that people will not participate and thereby will delegitimize the regime.

What exactly people have voted for is generally clear. Rouhani’s campaign successfully linked the economic crisis in the country (high inflation rate, unemployment, devaluation of the Iranian currency) to the current administration’s incompetence both in terms of economic planning as well as their confrontational and provocative international policy (mostly on the nuclear negotiations). The United Nations and the United States sanctions against Iran have exacerbated already difficult economic conditions in the country. For years Ahmadinejad argued that his administration welcomes these sanctions because they will lead to more innovation and less dependence on foreign powers. Neither happened.

Next to an international détente, Rouhani also stroke a similar chord when during the debates he argued that the best assurance against economic corruption and mismanagement is a free press and the freedom of expression. Easing of social restrictions and the protection of civil liberties are going to be more challenging for the Rouhani administration as he also has the backing of many social conservatives whose political capital is going to be a major asset in delivering his campaign promises.

Next month, right after Rouhani officially begins his presidency, will also be the beginning of disillusionments. I remember when I was in Iran in 2005, only a few weeks after Ahmadinejad was elected, in every little corner people were complaining that he has not delivered his campaign promises! Although I had not voted for him, I found myself defending him asking those who voted for him to give the man a chance. Whenever I hear that people are disillusioned, my first reaction is to wonder what their illusions were. Those who expect Rouhani to change the system of governance or to fashion a fundamental change in Iran are up for a great disappointment. He will institute incremental, piecemeal changes, nothing major, but enough to show that there indeed is a noticeable difference between who sits in the office of the president in Iran.

Only minutes after the results were announced earlier today, hundreds of thousands of Rouhani supporters flooded the streets of Tehran and other large cities. I have included some pictures from Tabriz, too.  Join the party:

SCENES FROM TABRIZ